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4. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1: BACKGROUND: 
It has been nineteen years since Woodhouse J. gave his judgment in 
Kilbride v Lake
1 
in the Supreme Court of New Zealand. Since then it has 
attracted much comment and analysis, both favourable and unfavourable, 
within New Zealand and in other countries.
2 
It has been considered in three New Zealand cases before this present 
3 
case; namely Polic e v Taylor , Helleman v 
4 
Collector of Customs and Andrew 
and Andrew v Transport Dept
5
, but Kilbride was not followed in any of them, nor 
was Woodhouse J. 's judgement approved or disapproved. Kilbride v Lake has 
6 
beenmenti.oned in passing in Barr v Civil Aviation Dept. (only in the arguments 
of counsel) and in Waimak Ltd v Transport Dept.
7 
8 
So it can be seen that before Tifaga v Dept of Labour was recently 
decided, there had been no case which had followed Kilbride, nor was there a 
case which had any evaluative statement of that case. Ther efore, when the 
9 
decision of Roper J. in the Christchurch Supreme Court was appealed to the 
Court of Appeal it gave that Court (consisting of Richmond P. Richardson J. 
and Woodhouse J, the originator of Kilbride) its first opportunity to 
evaluate the validity and scope of Woodhouse J.'s decision in Kilbride. 
1. 2; THE FACTS: 
The case was heard and decided on the 29th May and 21st November, 1980 
respectively. The facts were not in dispute at any stage of the proceedings. 
The appellant, Tifaga, had entered New Zealand in 1974 with a temporary entry 
permit issued under S.14 of the Immigration Act 1964. The permit was extended 
from time to time and on the final occasion it was extended to 10th August 1979. 
S.14(b) gave the Minister the right to revoke the permit at any time and 
this the Minister did on 28th July, 1979, as the appellant was about to be 
released from a six months' sentence of imprisonment. S.14(6) further provided 
that it was an offence not to leave New Zealand within such time as the Ministe r 
prescribed. The Minister had prescribed that Tifaga must leave New Zealand 
within 21 days of the revocation of the entry permit and this he failed to do. 
Tifaga had only sio cash when he received the recovation notice on the 
ev e of his release from prison. He had no luck obtaining a job and sought a 
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tax refund but had only $70 cash available on the expiry of the 21 day 
period. The cost of the airfare to Western Samoa was $330. Through his 
solicitor he asked for an extension of his permit until he had sufficient 
funds or alternatively that his airfare by paid by the immigration authorities. 
Both requests were denied. 
1.3; THE APPEAL 
Tifaga based his appeal on the argument that his failure to leave New 
Zealand was involuntary, and relied on Kilbride v Lake to support this. The 
appellant had been convicted by ·Mr Bradford S.M. in the Christchurch Magistrate's 
10 
Court and had unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal but all three judges 
delivered separate judgements, Richmond P. giving a short judgement, agreeing 
in principle with the judgement of Richardson J. 
Woodhouse J. applied the same reasoning he had adopted in Kilbride v 
Lake to the Tifaga situation and upheld his reasoning in the former case as 
l 'd f f 1 . ll 1 'f' . d h . a va i arm o ana ysis. He also c a ri ied and explaine tat particular 
reasoning. 
In Kilbride the defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle 
without displaying a current warrant of fitness; the Court accepted that 
there had been a proper warrant in position when the defendant left the car 
but that it had unexplainedly disappeared during his absence. The defendant 
did not remove the warrant but had failed immediately to replace it, because 
he was not in the vicinity at the time the warrant disappeared. 
Woodhouse J. in Tifaga, repeated his finding in Kilbride that, whether 
the offence was one of strict liability or not , the defendant must be shown 
to have 'caused' the offence in the sense that the actus reus cannot have 
'occurred fortuitously or as the result of the acts and omissions of somebody 
1 h h d d f h h d 'b'l' 12 e se over w om he a no control an or w om he a no responsi i ity. 
He emphasised that in Kilbride he found that the actus reus was not 
within the 'conduct, knowledge or control' of the defendant and therefore 
th . 13 
. h 
at the chain of causation was broken . He explained that w en the offence 
. ( . . . d 14) f . is in the form of an omission as in Kilbri e , tests o causation are 
difficult to apply and Woodhouse J.s solution in Kilbride, as explained in 
6. 
Tifaga, would be to decide whether causation and thus responsibility lies 
in a 'just and acceptable test which in terms of causation, volition, 
15 
opportunity, will enable the occurence to be linked with the defendant' 
Because the omission in Kilbride could not be attributed to the defendant 
in terms mentioned above, Woodhouse J. held in that case that the defendant 
. . 16 
had been incorrectly convicted. 
Considering the facts before him in Tifaga, Woodhouse J. held that there 
was no difficulty in finding that Tifaga had caused the omission (not leaving 
New Zealand by the time proscribed), and that his financial difficulties could 
not be regarded as an intervening cause interrupting the chain of causation 
because the position the defendant found himself in was caused by his own failure 
in his responsibility to ensure at all times that he had the means to leave 
17 
New Zealand. 
Richardson J. first of all made it clear that the alternative options 
(suggested by counsel for the respondent) of obtaining a loan or working 
his passage on a boat had no'basis in reality' and were not real options 
18 
available to the appellant. He stated that it was common ground that the 
offence was one of strict liability.
19 
The learned Judge further stated that there were differing approaches 
and forms of analysis to the type of defence upheld in Kilbride, and that 
the important consideration is to determine what factors must be present to 
find a defendant guilty (having regard to the particular statute creating 
20 
the offence.) Richardson J. found that the questions of 'freedom of choice' 
inevitability', 'impossibility' etc did not have to be decided in Kilbride 
but that the facts of Tifaga differed substantially from those in Kilbride 
and the learned Judge preferred to consider the defence raised as one of 
'impossibility of compliance', although he considered this as one of the 
. . 21 
several possible approaches to the question. 
This particular defence is one of common law, but it must be remembered 
that by virtue of S.20 Crimes Act 1961 this defence can only apply where 
· · · · 1 
22 · h d t t not inconsistent with the particu ar statute. Ric arson J. wen on o 
consider a series of cases which outlined the scope of the impossibility 
23 
defence. and concluded that: 'The principle of impossibility proceeds 
from the premise that the legislature is not be assumed to have intended 
, , I 24 
to punish for failure to perform the impossible. 
7. 
However the learned Judge concluded that the scope of the defence 
would not protect a person from criminal responsibility if the impossible 
situation that person found him/herself in arose through the fault of the 
defendant him/herself.
25 
Applying this principle to the present facts of 
Tifaga, Richardson J. held that the defence of impossibility was open to a 
defendant charged under S.14 (6) Immigration Act but that in this case the 
defendant was the 'author of his own misfortunes' because a temporary permit 
holder should at all times ensure he has sufficient funds to leave the country 
'f . d d 26 1 require to o so. 
Richmond P. also preferred to c onsider the defence raised as one of 
impossibility as such was discussed by Richardson J. but for the same reasons 
as the latter Judge held that the defence must fail.
27 
It is therefore to be seen that all three Judges dismissed the appeal 
for what are substantially the same reasons but that Woodhouse J. approached 
the issue in question from a significantly different angle than that which 
Richmond P. and Richardson J. adopted. 
Several aspects of interest to the criminal law are raised by this 
case. I shall in particular take a close look at: 
A. Woodhouse J.'s form of analysis. 
8. 
B. The scope and limitations of the impossibility/inevitability defence. 
c. Whether, and to what extent, involuntariness, impossibility/inevitability, 
and lack of causation are defences to strict liability offences. 
D. To what extent Tifaga reflects recent judicial trends. 
2. THE WOODHOUSE ANALYSIS 
2.1; DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY KILBRIDE v LAKE: 
Woodhouse J. 's form of analysis in Kilbride v Lake has caused difficulties 
amongst some observers in its interpretation. 
It is common ground that whether or not mens rea was a constituent part 
of the particular statutory offence in Kilbride was irrelevant to Woodhouse J. 's 
decision as the defence he outlined was not one involving denial of mens rea 
but one denying an actus reus attributable to the defendant. This is stated 
without doubt in the judgement in Kilbride,
28 
and reiterated by Woodhouse J. 
. . f 29 in Ti aga. 
30 
However, this was not understood in Police v Taylor , where Turner J. 
concluded that the important question in Kilbride was whether mens rea was a 
necessary element of the offence or not. This was, with respect, clearly 
wrong, as the Kilbride decision revolved around the question of whether the 
defendant was responsible for the actus reus of the offence. 
31 
Kilbride was not applied in Andrew and Andrew v Transport Dept where 
the defendant company was convicted of operating a motor vehicle in such a 
manner as to emit an excessive amount of smoke, an offence in its wording 
strikingly similar to that in Kilbride. The commission of the offence was 
unbeknown to the driver and caused by an unexpected mechanical failure, but 
McCarthy J. held that the appellant company operated a vehicle in the forbidden 
32 
condition and that was an end to the matter. Woodhouse J. could have said 
exactly the same of the Kilbride situation. 
33 
Kilbride was not applied in another case, Kelleman v Collector of Customs. 
There, Captain Helleman appealed against a conviction for being the 
master of a ship found with a secret place adapted for smuggling 
purposes, contrary to S.216 Customs Act 1913. The appellant had no 
knowledge of the hideaway and the Court accepted that only a 24 hour 
34 
a day vigil could have prevented the occurence of the offence. 
9. 
Hardie Boys J. held that the defence invoked in Kilbride did not 
apply because Helleman was responsible for the actus reus as he had 
caused the ship to enter New Zealand territorial waters. Exactly the 
same could have been said of Kilbride. i.e. that he caused the car to be 
on the road. 
However, Helleman was perhaps distinguishable from Kilbride in that 
in 
the statue breached/the former read; 
"If any ship comes or is found ... within the territorial waters of 
New Zealand having ... any secret or disguised place adapted for the purpose 
of concealing goods, or having any ... device adapted for the purpose of 
smuggling ... , the master ... of that ship shall be ... liable to a penalty 
of five hundred pounds.' 
The Helleman decision may have rested on the grounds that the words 
'comes or is found' may mean that all a defendant has to do to attract 
liability is cause a ship to come or be found in New Zealand waters, even 
if the defendant has no knowledge of any smuggling hideaways. 
If this interpretation is accepted, Helleman may have been distinguished 
from Kilbride on the basis of differing statutory language. 
The above three cases show the difficulties New Zealand Courts have had 
interpreting Woodhouse J. 's decision in Kilbride. 
Academic difficulty has been caused by Kilbride because Woodhouse J. 
referred to a variety of reasons for not attributing criminal responsibility 
to the defendant for the disappearance of the warrant. Amongst them: that 
there was no causal relationship to the offence; that the conduct was 
involuntary; that there was no other course open to the accused; that there 
was a break in the chain of causation; that the omission was outside the 
conduct, knowledge and control of the defendant. The difficulty academic 
writers have experienced is in interpreting how these various factors 
interrelate. Are they different stages or one or more tests? Are they 
all different defences or different names for the same defence? Is any 
one or more of them more important or precedent to any of the others? 
10. 
This difficulty is well outlined by the way various commentators have 
made their interpretations of the decision. Sir Francis Adams stated that 
the substance of the decision was; 
' .•. that the prosecution failed because there was no proof of any 
voluntary act or omisssion on the part of the defendant to which 
the absence of the warrant could be attributed ... ,
34
A 
Thus seemingly saying that there was a single defence. 
Budd and Lynch, however, thought that; 
' ..• Woodhouse J. produced two distinct (although sometimes blurred) 
reasons for the acquittal of Kilbride. The first of these was that, as 
some independent and intervening event caused the removal of the warrant 
from the windscreen, Kilbride did not cause the crime ... The second reason 
for the acquittal of Kilbride was that Kilbride was acting, or omitting to act, 
involuntarily as to the warrant coming away from the windscreen•
35 
R.S. Clark seemed to think there were three separate defences; 
'There is always a dangerof reading too much into a Judge's words but 
it is submitted that despite some confusion in Woodhouse J. 's language it 
is possible to isolate at least three types of situation in which the 
defendant is not responsible for the actus reus: the situation where the 
actus reus is "accidental" in the sense that the defendant has not "caused" 
the proscribed state of affairs; the situation where although the defendant's 
body in a sense "caused" the state of affairs he is said not to be responsible 
because he was acting "unconsciously" or "involuntary" or "in a state of 
automatism"; finally there is the situation where, as Woodhouse J. described 
it, "there was no other course open to him". •
36 
Thus can be seen the difficulties that have arisen in the interpretation 
of the judgement, with three different writers interpreting it in three 
different ways. 
2.2; THE EXPLANATION GIVEN IN TIFAGA: 
Now that Woodhouse J. has had the chance to explain his Kilbride 
analysis, I submit my own interpretation of it, with the obvious 
advantage of the Tifaga judgement before me. 
11. 
The basis of the judgement in Kilbride is the question of causation -
was the offence within the 'conduct, knowledge or control' of the defendant 
or did it occur independent of him? Although the question is easily answered 
in most cases of straightforward prohibited acts e.g. robbery, assault, it 
presents difficulties where the prohibited event has occurred by reason of 
an omission. 
It could theoretically be said that everybody has caused the particular 
omission. For example, if the offence is failure to provide a child with 
the necessitiesof life, it would be logically correct to say that every 
member of the community has failed to provide such necessities. By common 
sense, it is obvious that everyone is not guilty of an offence. 
To overcome this difficulty in determining whether a defendant caused 
theoffence through an omission, Woodhouse J. held that the offence must be 
linked to the defendant in terms of volition, opportunity, voluntariness etc.
37 
Thus voluntariness, as it is used in Kilbride, is the means for testing 
whether the defendant caused the offence where difficulties arise in determining 
this question in offences that involve omissions. 
This is borne out in Woodhouse J.s judgement in Tifaga where he explains 
his Kilbride reasoning: 
"When the actus reus is produced by the commission of an act it will 
usually be a straightforward matter to recognise whether or not the 
defendant charged with the offence really was the actor. But it is different 
where the event has occurred by reason of an omission to do something. It 
can fairly be said that everybody has omitted to do that particular thing so 
that individual responsibility, if it exists, must depend upon some just and 
acceptable test which in terms of causation, volition, opportunity, will 
enable the occurence to be linked with the defendant ... the {omission) could 
not be attributed to the defendant (in Kilbride) in terms of causation, 
volition, opportunity or otherwise that I held that there was no proof of an 
offence by him whatever might be said of the presence of the vehicle on the 
road after the warrant of fitness had disappeared from it. This part of the 
• 
analysis in the judgement led me to refer to conscious volition or 
opportunity of choice as an essential basis for testing responsibility 
for acts or omissions; and in order to decide whether there could be 
a causal relationship between the defendant and the occurence of the 
"b d . . . ,38 proscri e situation in that case. 
2.3; THE UNIQUENESS OF THE ANALYSIS: 
Thus Woodhouse J. has taken the unusual step of fusing previously 
distinct concepts into one test, where the concepts of 'volition, 
opportunity or otherwise' are used as a basis for testing causation 
for omissions. Nowhere have I been able to find a judicial precedent 
of any kind for this approach, nor any academic reference to it at all, 
including those authorities referred to by Woodhouse J. in Kilbride and 
Tifaga. It is, as far as I am aware, a form of analysis that is unique 
and a creation of the learned Judge. 
12. 
As far as the causation issue is concerned, the usual approach in the 
case of ommissions is that a person is held responsible for a situation 
where that situation has been contributed to by that person's omissions
39 
but I have been unable to find any widely accepted method by which the Courts 
will apply this to a fact situation. As pointed out by Ryu, the modern 
approach to causation is ultimately one of legal policy rather than one of 
a single 'science of philosophy 1 •
40 
The concepts of 'volition, opportunity or otherwise' or 'conscious 
volition or opportunity of choice used by Woodhouse J. as a basis for 
testing causation are very vague in their meaning. In Kilbride, Woodhouse J. 
used the word 'involuntary' but preferred to use the words 'volition, 
opportunity or otherwise' in Tifaga and was careful not to refer to involuntariness. 
The reason behind this is probably that the term 'involuntariness' is 
used to mean different things in different contexts. The terms 'voluntary' 
41 
and'involuntary' are noted to be of extremely vague repute. To overcome any 
difficulty in interpreting what was meant by 'involuntariness', Woodhouse J. 
carefully avoided its use in Tifaga. 
In Ryan v R.
42
, an involuntary act was described as an "unwilled act
1143
. 
Russell prefers to define a volunatry act as one that is conscious and 
44 
uncompelled. Hart describes voluntary conduct as "the expression of an act 
13. 
of will' or the result of muscular contractions caused by a desire 
, 45 , I 
for those same contractions. This is very similar to Prevezer s comment 
that; 'A person's action can be said to be involuntary when his will does 
not govern the movement of his limbs
146 
Whicheverof these interpretations is favoured, it is clear that 
neither of them corresponds to what Woodhouse J. meant in Kilbride when he 
was referring to involuntariness. There were no unconscious or compelled 
acts in Kilbride, nor was there any question of any bodily movements un-
controlled by the will. 
2.4; IMPOSSIBILITY DISGUISED? 
It is submitted that when Woodhouse J. referred to involuntariness in 
his judgement in Kilbride, he was in fact considering what amounts to the 
defence of impossibility. In Kilbride, Woodhouse J. said; 
' ... a person cannot be made criminally responsible for an act or 
omission unless it was done or omitted in circumstances where there was 
some other course open to him. If this condition is absent, any act or 
omission must be involuntary, or unconscious or unrelated to the forbidden 
• d ' • ' 'l' I 47 event in any causal sense regarde by the law as involving responsibi ity. 
'Some other choice open to him' is merely another way of stating the 
impossibility defence and it is the opinion of the writer that impossibility 
is in fact what Woodhouse J. is referring to when he mentions involuntariness. 
In Tifaga the learned Judge uses the words 'conscious volition or opportunity 
of choice,•
48 
clearly indicating that he has impossibility in mind. 
It would seem, therefore, that Woodhouse J. is including impossibility 
within the meaning of 'involuntariness'. This is not the most common approach 
but several writers have also defined impossibility as being within the 
. . . 49 
notion of involuntariness. 
2.5; VIABILITY OF THE WOODHOUSE ANALYSIS: 
Woodhouse J. 's analysis, as stated, is a novel one in an area which 
has received much judicial attention. However, this should not detract from 
an evaluation of its soundness as legal reasoning. 
14. 
When Woodhouse J. applies his analysis to the Tifaga situation he 
makes it clear that there is no doubt that Tifaga caused the forbidden 
omission i.e. the failure to leave New Zealand. I respectfully submit 
that this is a correct application of the Woodhouse analysis. In terms 
of opportunity ofchoice the appellant had that opportunity and therefore, 
according to the analysis, he caused the commission of the offence. Any 
lack of opportunity of choice was caused by his own failure to keep 
adequate funds to enable him to leave the country. 
It is well established that the impossibility defence fails where the 
so 
impossibility has been brought about by the defendant's own fault. 
Woodhouse J.s decision in Tifaga engrafts the same principle upon his form 
of analysis. Therefore, the position the appellant found himself in was 
produced by his own fault, there was thus an opportunity of choice and, 
following the next logical step in the analysis, this means that the appellant 
has caused his own failure to leave New Zealand. 
The other Court of Appeal Judges preferred to look at the case in a 
more 'traditional' manner, i.e. in terms of an impossibility defence. The 
result of both analyses is the same, and for much the same reason that Tifaga 
contributed to his own misfortunes. The only real difference, it is submitted, 
is that, according to the Woodhouse approach, a successful plea of 
impossibility (although he doesn't call it that) means that the defendant hasn't 
caused the actus reus whereas under the more traditional approach it means 
that there is a successful impossibility defence. 
As explained, it is the writer's opinion that the reasoning in 
Kilbride amounted to a consideration of the impossibility defence, although 
Woodhouse J. used different nomenclature. His analysis is not restricted 
. ( . . . f ) 51 
to that field, however, but extends to automatism as he points out in Ti aga , 
and involuntariness. If either of these defences is successfully raised, then, 
according to the analysis, the defendant has not caused the offence. 
It is submitted that, if the Woodhouse approach is applied correctly, 
the same result will be achieved as if the more accepted traditional approach 
is taken i.e. a traditional defence of impossibility (or involuntariness etc). 
However due to the difficulty, both in language and analysis, that the 
Woodhouse approach takes, it is likely to be misinterpreted, misapplied, or 
misused for unintended purposes by future Courts, lawyers and writers, 
although it does represent a unique approach to the problem of causation in 
15. 
respect of omissions. 
2.6; REASONS FOR WOODHOUSE J. 'S ANALYSIS: 
One must therefore ask why Woodhouse J. has chosen this hitherto unheard 
form of analysis when his fellow Judges in Tifaga saw no problem in applying a 
more well-known impossibility analysis. 
It is possible that Woodhouse J. felt that he could not invoke the 
concept of impossibility in Kilbride because the offence in that case was 
an act (operating a motor vehicle) coupled with an omission (failing to display 
a warrant of fitness). It has been tentatively suggested by Smith and Hogan that 
the defence applies 52 
/ to omission offences only. Woodhouse J. may have seen this as a barrier 
to applying the impossibility defence to offences consisting of act coupled 
with an omission and developed his alternative analysis to circumvent this 
problem. 
However, it is unlikely that this is what prevented Woodhouse J. from 
invoking impossibility. There is no good reason why the impossibility defence 
should not apply as equally to acts as omissions, as I will show later. 
Furthermore, Tifaga was involved with a pure omission offence but Woodhouse J. 
applied his analysis to that case in the same way he had in Kilbride, although 
this may have possibly been done partly because to do otherwise would be 
seen as a retreat from the Kilbride analysis, which Woodhouse J. probably 
didn't want. 
Whatever his reasons for doing so, Woodhouse J. shied away from the 
impossibility analysis. He may have doubted the acceptability of this defence; 
it is a defence of rare application which seems to have been inconsistently 
1 . d h h . h' 
53 1 . 1 dh h app ie t roug out its istory. A ternative y Woo ouse J. may ave 
preferred to think of impossibility as a tool for testing causation (which is 
how it is used in his analysis), rather than as a general defence. 
2.7; CONCLUSIONS: 
According to the Woodhouse analysis, 'conscious volition or opportunity 
of choice,'is the basis for testing causation of omissions. From the language 
used it seems that Woodhouse J. had impossibility in mind when enunciating 
this test. It is not clear whether 'conscious volition or opportunity of 
choice' was intended to be the sole test for causation or not. There may well 
be situations where a defendant has not caused an omission but nevertheless had 
conscious volition and opportunity of choice . There is no indication from 
Kilbride or Woodhouse J. 's judgement in Tifaga what the result would be in 
such a situation. 
16 . 
3 . IMPOSSIBIILITY/INEVITABILITY 
3.1; HISTORY : 
Both Richmond P. and Richardson J. preferred to consider the defence 
raised by the appellant as one of impossibility or inevitability
54
, rather 
than attempt any treatment of Tifaga along the lines of the Woodhouse 
approach in Kilbride . 
Impossibility defences are not common - in fact it has been described 
55 
as the ' rare defence ' . Its application has been virtually confined to 
offences consisting of omissions . It is a general proposition of law that 
where a legal duty to act is imposed, non-compliance with that duty will not 
56 
be an offence where it is physically impossible to comply . This is based on 
thecommon sense notion that there is little point in punishing a person for 
omitting to do something which there was no possibility of that person doing. 
Although the impossibility defence has its roots in two nineteenth 
57 . 58 
century cases, its main basis comes from Burns v Bidder and the cases 
59 
reviewed within, especially Leicester v Pearson . In the Burns case, a 
motorist argued that he failed to give way to a pedestrian because of a 
latent brake defect. The Appeal Court held that such a failure would amount 
to a valid defence because the occurrence of the forbidden offence was 'outside 
his possible or reasonable control and in respect of which he was in no way 
60 
at fault.' 
In Leicester v Pearson, an appellate Court upheld a dismissal of 
information concerning another fialure to give way to a pedestrian because 
" ... what happened was inevitable or was due to some circumstance over which 
h 
'b , 61 
t e driverhad no reasonable or possi le control... In that case the 
defendant failed to give way as he didn't see the pedstrian due to a 
combination of lack of lighting, poor visibility and bad road conditions. 
In another pedestrian crossing case, London Passenger Transport Board v 
~pso~, Lord Uthwatt held that the defence of impossibility would apply if it 
is 'impossible in any rational sense to comply with (the statute) •
62
. 
3.2: INEVITABILITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY: 
The impossibility defence was considered and discussed at length by 
R . hm d ( h ) . 1. d 
63 f h . . ic on J. as e was then in Po ice v Gee on. He was o t e opinion 
that the concept of impossibility as accepted in Burns v Bidder was the 
.17. 
same as the concept of inevitability discussed in Leicester v Pearson. 
As Richmond J. remarked; "that which is "inevitable" is also impossible 
'd'64 . to avo1 . This close relationship between impossibility and inevitability 
was accepted by Richardson J. in Tifaga, and as he observed, the difference 
65 
between the two is 'more apparent than real'. 
It would seem then, that the difference between 'inevitability' and 
'impossibility' is merely one of semantics. Both Richmond P. and Richardson J. 
are prepared to accept this and treat them as the same defence. 
3.3; IMPOSSIBILITY AND ACTS: 
I mentioned earlier that the application of the impossibility defence 
has been virtually confined to omission offences.
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Although the defence 
applies more easily to this type of offence there is no reason why it cannot 
also apply to offences cons.isting solely of acts. An example is a butcher who 
sells contaminated meat where s/he has no practical way of knowing or finding 
out that the meat is unsound. If we will allow a driver to escape conviction 
where s /he fails to give way because of a latent brake defect, there is no 
reason why that reasoning should not be extended to our unfortunate butcher. 
The impossibility defence should apply equally to acts as it does to 
omissions. 
3.4; THE IMPOSSIBILITY STANDARD: 
How high a standard of conduct does an accused have to fulfil befor e 
s/he can avail him/herself of the impossibility defence? 
It is certain that impossibility does not refer to lack of any 
choice whatsoever, but to lack of any 'practical choice' as Richmond P. 
puts it.
67 
Thus, if Kilbride is looked at in terms of impossibility, it 
could be suggested that it was not impossible for the defendant to avoid 
c ommitting the offence because it was physically possible for him to guard 
and supervise the warrant of fitness or hire someone else to do so during 
his absence. However, such a suggestion is ridiculous because it would not 
be a viable practical choice. 
Similarly, in Leicester v Pearson the defendant could have stopped his 
car at the pedestrian crossing, got out and checked the crossing before 
driving on, but such a suggestion has no practical basis. 
18. 
It can be seen then, that a defence will lie where it is impossible, 
for all practical intentsand purposes,for the defendant to avoid the 
commission of the offence. 
It is to be noted that the standard required is, however, very high. 
Leicester v Pearson was decided on 'very special' facts and the defence was 
68 
held to be applicable to a 'limited sphere'. 
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In Weiss v Green , the defendant was convicted of selling wine over 20 
per cent proof spirit, albeit unwittingly. Her defence to the strict 
liability offence was that she had taken all precautions to ensure her suppliers 
supplied her with wine of the correct percentage proof spirit, was not 
accepted on appeal as it was held to be possible for her to sample each barrel 
of wine before sale, even though such a course would involve considerable 
difficulty and cost. 
Similarly, in Hobbs v Winchester Corp.
70 
it was held that a butcher must, 
if necessary, employ an analyst to ensure no unsound meat is sold. 
Although in the last two mentioned cases impossibility was not pleaded, 
the Courts had the opportunity to allow a defence along the lines of 
impossibility. These two illustrations help to show that the standard expected 
to fulfil the defence is high indeed. The rarity of cases where an impossibility 
defence has been successfully argued further shows this. 
Indeed the defence has been described as one of 'total absence of fault': 
Richmond P. described it in this way in Tifaga
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If someone is totally absent 
from fault, that person must have done everything that could practically be 
expected to avoid committing the offence; it must have been practically 
impossibly to avoid the commission of the offence. 
'Total absence of fault' or 'impossibility' implies a standard higher 
than that of criminal negligence - to fulful the defence the defendant must 
be as free as practically possible from any type of fault. 
3.5: THE TWO-STAGE TEST: 
Consonant with this high standard is the cardinal principal that an 
impossibility defence must fail where the impossibility arises through or 
is contributed to by any fault or failing attributable to the defendant, 
even where such fault has occurred previous to the prohibited omission. 
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This principle is accepted by the Courts and commentato
rs and is 
unhesistantly adopted by Richardson J. in Tifaga.
74 
The effect of this principle is to create a two-stage test
 for 
impossibility. The first, 'at the time' stage involves lo
oking at 
whether or not it was practically possible for the defenda
nt to avoid 
19. 
committing the offence at the time it was committed. If 
it is found that 
it was impossible 'at the time' in this first stage, then 
the second stage 
involves looking at the conduct of the defendant leading u
p to the commission 
of the offence to determine if the defendant caused or con
tributed to the 
impossible positions/he found her/himself in. If the def
endant did cause 
to contribute to his/her own predicament then the second s
tage is not 
satisfied and the defence must fail. 
Looking at the facts of Tifaga, it is clear that the first
 stage is 
satisfied. At the time of the offence (i.e. the expiry of
 the 21 days 
following the permit revocation when Tifaga was still in N
ew Zealand) it 
was impossible for Tifaga to leave the country because he 
had no money with 
which to do it. Thus, at the time of the offence, it was p
ractically impossible 
to avoid the breach of S.14(6) of the Immigration Act. 
However, in the opinion of Richmond P. and Richardson J. o
f the Court 
of Appeal, Tifaga did not fulfil the necessary standard fo
r the second 
stage of the defence . The Court held that it was incumben
t upon Tifaga to 
keep a fund available to cover the cost of an airfare bac
k to Western 
Samoa as he should have known that he could be given short
 notice to leave 
New Zealand at any time. 
When he found himself in the position of not being able to
 comply with 
the notice to leave h e sought work without success. He as
ked for an 
extension of permit until he could afford to pay for the a
irfare or 
alternatively that the Immigration authorities pay his tri
p but both 
requests were declined.
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These efforts were not enough to fulfil the 
required standard, according to the Court of Appeal, and t
he conviction 
was upheld. It is submitted with respect that as such the
 decision was 
~orrectly decided in terms of the principles of impossibi
lity. 
• 
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3.6; HOW HIGH IS THE STANDARD? 
A problem raised by the Tifaga case is exactly how high the standard 
should be to fulfil the impossibility defence. This problem is compounded 
by two factors; the rarity of cases in which the defence has been considered and 
76 
the inconsistency of its application by the Courts 
As explained in 3.4 the standard for the first 'at the time' stage of 
the impossibility test is high. But exactly how high this standard is has 
not been determined, and neither of the Court of Appeal Judges attempts an 
answer. 
How high is the standard of the second stage of the defence? Must a 
defendant fulfil the high standard of the first stage and similarly fulfil an 
equally high standard for the second 'prior conduct' stage of the defence? 
Or is the standard required relaxed somewhat for the second stage? 
It is clear that the impossibility defence is negated by the fault of 
failing of the defendant, but how high is the defendant expected to act to 
avoid placing him/herself in an impossible situation2 In Tifaga, Richardson 
J. indicated that an impossibility defence would lie if the appellant had 
been robbed while on his way to the airline office to buy his ticket or 
had been hospitalised or in prison throughout the term of the notice. But 
what would happen if the appellant was hospitalised due to his own negligence 
or in circumstances in which he might have been able to avoid hospitalisation? 
What if the appellant had enough money to cover his airfare, had invested it, 
and the investment had collapsed? Would the appellant be able to avail 
himself of the impossibility defence? 
These questions must remain unanswered. In Tifaga, Richardson J. 
held that the impossibility defence will not be upheld where an accused has 
not used 'due diligence' to avoid the impossible situation,
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but it is unclear 
exactly what is meant by 'due diligence'. Does it mean ordinary negligence 
or a higher standard is required for the second stage of the test? 
Although Tifaga raises the problem of what standard is required for 
each of the two stages of the impossibility defence, the case leaves us without 
any answers to these questions. 
-
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3.7: THE EFFECTS OF DUAL ANALYSIS: 
It is significant that neither Riclunond P.; nor Richardson J., passed 
any adverse comment whatsoever upon the Woodhouse decision in Kilbride. 
Indeed, Richardson J., who delivered the leading judgementof the impossibility 
approach in Tifaga, saw that there were alternative approaches so that 
both his and that of Woodhouse J. were equally viable.
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The effect, then, 
of the Tifaga decisions seems to be that there are alternative defences in 
this area of law; the impossibility defence and the Kilbride defence. It is 
to be noted that counsel for the appellant argued the defence along the 
lines of Kilbride, but it was considered in terms of impossibility by Roper J. 
in the Supreme Court and by Riclunond P. and Richardson J. in the Court of 
Appeal. 
Of the two forms of analysis, the Richardson impossibility approach is 
more likely to prevail and be used before future courts. It has the weight 
of precedent and does not present the difficulties in interpretation and 
use, not mention the novelty, that exists in the Woodhouse analysis. It is 
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of note that no other Judge, either in Tifaga, Taylor, Andrew and Andrew 
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or Helleman has followed the Woodhouse approach, although the facts of those 
cases gave ample opportunity to do so. 
However, despite the fact that one of the alternative approaches is 
likely to prevail, there still are two possible alternatives. Counsels for 
defence may, in future cases, have to make a choice as to which line of 
reasoning they will follow and this must depend on several factors, not the 
least important being which Court and Judge/swill be hearing the case. 
This must lead to some difficulty, especially if the two lines of reasoning 
become confused or misinterpreted. This possibility of confusion is the 
necessary price of the Court of Appeal's flexible approach to the analysis 
of this sort of situation. 
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4. DEFENCES TO STRICT LIABILITY OFFENCES 
4.1: APPLICATION OF DEFENCES: 
The following defences (involuntariness, impossibility and lack 
of causation) are of particular interest in the context of strict 
liability offences. In most mens rea situations the defences are of 
limited application because if they are applicable it is more likely 
that a defence of absence of mens rea will be pleaded e.g. if a defendant 
conunitted an offence where it was impossible to avoid committing it then 
it is highly likely that the defendant did not intend to commit it and 
thus there would be no mens rea. 
The following defences are of greater application to offences of 
strict liability as absence of mens rea cannot be pleaded, therefore 
alternative defences will be sought. 
4.2: INVOLUNTARINESS: 
Involuntariness is a valid defence to offences of strict liability. 
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Hill v Baxter was concerned with failing to observe a 'Halt' sign, an 
offence of strict liability. Involuntariness, or more precisely 
automatism, was held to be a valid defence if it could be proved. This 
has not, to my knowledge, been criticised by any Court but has been 
accepted as authority. This has also been accepted by all writers and 
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conunentators , except for Budd and Lynch in their article 'Voluntariness, 
' d ' ' 'l' I 84 Causation an Strict Liabi ity . 
The question remains, should a defendant be able to rely on such a 
defence when charged with an offence of strict liability? This must 
depend on what one considers to be the justification or rationale behind 
offences of a strict liability nature. Much has been written on this topic 
and I do not propose to go into any detailed discussion of the rationale 
behind strict liability. 
I will examine the two main justifications forwarded in support of 
strict liability: 
1. Firstly, it is argued that a high standard of care is required on 
the part of those who partake in certain activities that directly 
affect social interests and the public welfare. The threat of a 
strict liability punishment encourages such people to perform up 
. . . 85 
to the standard that the public interest requires. 
• 
23. 
If this justification is accepted then it is submitted that 
convicting people for their involuntary actions does not advance 
in any way the public interest as those people would be in no 
position to prevent their involuntary actions and thereby prevent 
the offence. 
Take, for instance, a driver who exceeds the speed limit because of 
involuntary lllOVements due to an attack by a swarm of bees. Assuming 
the driver had no practical way of knowing or preventing the attack, 
then punishing that driver could in no way prevent future occurrence 
of that offence. It in no way encourages other drivers to avoid 
committing the offence themselves, as they have no opportunity of 
preventing involuntary acts. The punishment is of no benefit to the 
public interest. 
Budd and Lynch have criticised the use of involuntariness as a 
defence to strict liability offences in their article looking at the 
Kilbride decision.
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They felt that convicting those in an involuntary 
state would help prevent the social harm the particular statute is 
aimed at. They thought that such convictions would encourage research 
into the causes, diagnoses and cures of involuntary states. 
It is submitted that this is expecting too .much of the reasonable 
man. It is clearly ridiculous to require an ordinary person to 
conduct research into the causes, diagnoses and cures of automatism. 
The law can only encourage research or business, reorganisation that 
is within the practical power of the person to perform, and to expect 
more cannot be a practical way of reducing the social harm the 
particular legislation is aimed at. 
2. A second justification sometimes forwarded in support of strict 
liability is that of ease of judicial administration; strict 
liability saves the Court's time because a defendant cannot raise a 
plea of lack of fault and it furthermore prevents false pleas of 
this kine. 
Thus the task of the prosecution is made much easier; it does not have to 
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prove the persuasive burden of proving mens rea beyond all 
reasonable doubt. In this way, strict liability is justified, it 
is said, because the desirability of convicting those guilty 
parties who might otherwise plead a defence justifies the 
conviction of some who might be innocent. 
If this justification is accepted it is true that the reasoning 
would extend to a plea of involuntariness. But this second 
justification is losing any popularity it once might have had.
87 
Firstly, any such plea is likely to be heard in mitigation of 
penalty anyway, so the matters involved would still have to be 
heard by the Court; thus saving no judicial time. 
Secondly, it is abhorrent to many legal theorists that guilt be 
imposed on a possibly 'innocent' defendant for the purpose of 
easing the Court's work or to avoid difficulties otherwise 
experienced by the prosecution in overcoming the presumption of 
innocence. Many do not favour convicting possibly innocent 
defendants for the purposes of ensuring conviction of those who are 
guilty, even where the crime is of a .minor or regulatory nature. 
Thus, this second justification sometimes forwarded on behalf of 
strict liability has attracted much criticism because it has been 
seen as infringing the principle of presumption of innocence. 
As shown earlier,
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in terms of the first of the rationales given 
for strict liability offences, there is no reason why the defence 
of involuntariness should not also apply to such offences, and there 
are doubts as to the soundness of the second justification. 
The concept of 'involuntariness' was carefully avoided by Woodhouse J 
in Tifaga, although it featured as part of his reasoning in the 
Kilbride decision. There was nothing in either decision to suggest 
that the fact that the offence was one of strict liability in any way 
affected the application of the principles of voluntariness to the 
facts. 
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Involuntariness is, and should be, a defence to offences of a 
strict liability nature. 
4.3: IMPOSSIBILITY: 
It is well established that impossibility is also a defence to a 
. 1 · ab. 1. h h . 
89 · dd 90 strict i i ity c arge. Bot Leicester v Pearson and Burns v Bi er , 
which are cited as authorities involving the application of the law of 
impossibility, were cases concerned with strict liability offences. In 
both, there was no mention that the impossibility defence was in any way 
affected by the fact that the offence was one of strict liability. The 
Tifaga case, being one of strict liability 
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, confirms this principle 
that the defence holds true for such offences. 
The reasons underlying this principle are essentially the same as 
those behind the application of the involuntariness defence to strict 
liability offences. If the principle rationale behind strict liability 
is accepted as being that of ensuring measures are taken to prevent the 
occurrence of an offence, then punishing those for whom it is impossible 
to avoid committing the offence can in no way be in the public interest, 
not prevent future occurrences of the offence. 
Impossibility can be thought of as 'total absence of fault'. If a 
person has fulfilled the requirements of the impossibility defences/he 
has conformed to the highest standard of performance that could be practically 
expected of that person. To expect him/her to perform to any higher 
standard is to expect him/her to perform what is impossible for that person 
to do. Such people are in no position to prevent the occurrence of the 
offence and punishing them does not advance the public interest. 
Therefore,impossibility should be, and is, a defence to strict 
liability offences. This position is clearly supported by Richardson J and 
Richmond Pin Tifaga. Neither gave any indication that the defence of 
impossibility is in any way affected by the fact that the offence is strict 
in nature; the defence applies equally to either mens rea or strict 
liability offences. However, the defence will be of particular interest in 
the area of the latter type of offence, because if an impossibility defence 
lies, so also, usually, will a plea of lack of mens rea. 
The impossibility defence is one of common law that evolves from the 
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presumption that Parliament did not intend to punish those for whom it 
was impossible to comply with the law. Such a presumption applies to 
strict liability statutes as well, but it is theoretically possible that 
the presumption might be rebutted by the wording of the statute, i.e. a 
strict interpretation of the statute might show Parliament's intention 
to exclude the impossibility defence. 
For this reason, both Richardson Jin Tifaga and Richmond J (as he 
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was then) in Police v Creedon , looked at the wording of the relevant 
provision to see if the defence is so excluded
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. However, it is 
extremely unlikely that the legislature would ever word a statute in a 
way that could be interpreted as intending to punish those for whom 
compliance with the law was impossible. 
In strict liability offences, the lack of knowledge of relevant 
circumstances is no defence to the charge, as this amounts to a denial of 
mens rea, which is irrelevant in terms of strict liability offences. The 
position may be different if the lack of knowledge of relevant circumstances 
means that there was no practical opportunity to avoid the offence. If 
that was the case, a defendant, although not being able to plead lack of 
mens rea, could instead plead impossibility, the impossibility being due 
to lack of knowledge. 
For instance, take the facts of Kilbride. The actus reus in that case 
was committed because the defendant had no knowledge of the disappearance 
of the warrant of fitness. It was because of this lack of knowledge that 
it was impossible for the defendant to avoid the commission of the offence. 
Thus, impossibility could have been pleaded. 
Therefore, although as a general rule lack of knowledge is no defence 
to a strict liability offence, because it concerns a question of mens rea, 
which is irrelevant, there is an exception where such lack of knowledge 
amounts to a defence of impossibility. 
4.4: LACK OF CAUSATION: 
In both Kilbride and Tifaga Woodhouse J asserts that before a 
defendant can be convicted of any offence, the defendant must be shown to 
be 
As 
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responsible for or produce the physical ingredient of the offence. 
1 . d 
95 ' 'f 1 exp aine , in Ti aga the earned Judge went on to say that the test 
of such causation was 'conscious volition or opportunity of choice'. 
This presents the question whether lack of causation should be a 
defence to an offence that is strict in nature. Although Woodhouse J 
seems to accept that it is, this is qualified by the use of what is 
essentially the impossibility defence as a means of testing causation.
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It is submitted that lack of causation on the part of the defendant 
should not be,of itself, a defence to strict liability offences, because 
to do so would seriously threaten the operation of strict liability. The 
purpose behind imposing strict liability is to impose a high standard of 
care upon those who partake in certain activities that directly affect 
social interests and the public welfare. There may be cases where a 
defendant did not directly cause a strict liability offence but was 
nevertheless in a position to take measures to prevent its occurrence. 
To impose liability on that person would ensure a high standard of 
performance which would be in the public interest. 
For instance, take the example of a butcher who sells contaminated 
meat. The statute concerned prohibits selling contaminated meat and 
punishes a butcher for doing so because this encourages a higher standard 
of care and thus helps protect the public from being sold unfit meat. 
Is the purpose of the statute advanced by convicting our butcher? 
This must depend on the circumstances under which the meat became 
contaminated. I will look at four fact situations: 
l. Suppose the meat became infected because the butcher negligently 
failed to disinfect his/her hands before handling the meat. There is 
no problem here; the defendant butcher is the cause of the offence and 
it is possible for the offence to be avoided. To punish the butcher 
will encourage all butchers to perform their trade up to the standard 
the public interest requires. 
2. Suppose our butcher disinfects his/her hands, but just before touching 
28. 
the meat, some disinfectant-resistant bacteria contaminates his/her 
hands, and thus the meat is infected. Our butcher is unaware of this 
and there was no practical ways/he could have been aware. The 
butcher has caused the offence but an impossibility defence would lie. 
As discussed, convicting a person in circumstances where the defence 
could not practically be avoided does not aid the purpose of a strict 
liability statute. 
3. Suppose our butcher leaves meat on the counter for a client. Another 
customer comes into the shop and touches the meat, contaminating it, 
while the butcher is not there. 
Here, the butcher did not cause the contamination; the meat became 
unsound when touched by the customer. However, our butcher was in a 
position to prevent the contamination; s/he could have supervised 
the meat to make sure it was not touched and infected or have kept 
the meat in a place where it would not be touched. 
The purpose underlying the statute would be advanced by a conviction 
in this case - it would encourage butchers to better supervise their 
operations to ensure no unfit meat is sold. Therefore, the butcher 
should be convicted despite the fact that s/he did not cause the 
offence, lack of causation should not be a defence. 
4. Situation 3 would be different if the butcher had taken all practical 
steps to prevent contamination e.g. the meat had been properly stored 
but a customer or stranger had, unbeknown to the butcher, jumped over 
the counter, sneaked into the storage compartment and touched and 
infected the meat. In this example, our butcher would be acquitted, 
not because s/he did not cause the offence but because it was 
practically impossible to avoid the offence (options such as hiring a 
permanent guard for the meat or never opening the shop are not 
considered practical possibilities). 
The above examples show that while no purpose is served in convicting 
those who cannot practically avoid an offence, the purposes of a strict 
liability offence are served by convicting those whose only defence is lack 
of causation. This is because such convictions would encourage the 
defendants to act to prevent the occurrence of an offence where they are in 
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a position to do so. Where they are not in a position to prevent the offence, 
another defence e.g. impossibility, will lie. 
It is therefore submitted that lack of causation should not, of itself, 
be a defence to an offence of strict liability. Although comments of 
Woodhouse Jin Kilbride may indicate that the learned Judge would allow lack 
of causation as a defence to all strict liability offences, a careful 
reading of his judgment in Tifaga qualifies this. As explained earlier,
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the basis on which Woodhouse J would test causation for omissions is by 
'conscious volition or opportunity of choice' or, in other words, 
impossibility. 
Therefore Woodhouse J would not allow a lack of causation defence in 
all cases but only where there is no 'conscious volition or opportunity of 
choice', or, in other words, where an impossibility defence lies. 
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5. THE TIFAGA CASE AND THE JUDICIAL TREND AGAINST STRICT LIABILITY 
5.1: THE JUDICIAL TREND: 
The concept of strict liability is not one of common law but one that 
has developed from the interpretation of the enactments of the legislature. 
If a statute is interpreted to impose strict liability then mens rea is not 
required for at least one element of the actus reus. 
The concept of strict liability has in recent times lost a lot of 
judicial popularity it might have once enjoyed. In modem judicial 
decisions it is clear that there exists a trend against the imposition of 
strict liability. A nurnber of important landmark decisions have 
unequivocably shown a general judicial disrelish for this type of liability. 
. h' 'k98 . h d h . f R v Lim C im Ai establis e t e presumption o mens rea as an 
integral part of the interpretation of criminal statutes. According to 
the Lim Chim Aik principle, it is presumed that Parliament did not intend 
to impose strict liability and this presumption is only overcome if the 
statute, expressly or impliedly, imposes strict liability. This principle 
was unhesitantly adopted into New Zealand law in R v Strawbridge.
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Even where the presumption is overcome, it may well be that strict 
liability is not imposed. A middle class of offence, the 'half-way house' 
offence, was incorporated into New Zealand by B v Strawbridge. The basis 
of this type of offence is that the prosecution will only have to prove that 
the defendant had the necessary mens rea if the defendant raises absence of 
mens rea as a defence. Thus the evidentiary burden of raising the defence 
lies with the defendant, whereas the persuasive burden of proving mens rea 
beyond a reasonable doubt still lies with the prosecution once lack of mens 
rea is pleaded as a defence. 
In addition, a half-way house offence may or may not include negligence 
as a form of mens rea applicable to the offence. If negligence is included, 
then the defendant will be convicted ifs/he has not fulfilled the reasonable 
person standard. Whether or not negligence is included as a form of mens rea 
applicable to the half-way house offence will depend on the judicial 
interpretation of the intention of the legislature. 
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Thus can be seen the trend against strict liability. There is a 
strong presumption against strict liability and even when this is 
overcome it may well be that the Courts may interpret the statute as 
imposing a half-way house rather than imposing liability of a strict 
nature. 
5.2: DEFENCES TO STRICT LIABILITY: 
Associated with the trend against strict liability is an apparent 
widening of the number and scope of acceptable defences to both strict 
liability and half-way house offences. We have already seen how 
involuntariness and impossibility are two such accepted defences. 
An important New Zealand decision in this area is Police v Creedon.
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That case involved a failure to give way at a 'Give Way' intersection, 
where the driver's view of approaching traffic was obscured. The Court of 
Appeal unanimously held (although expressing their reasoning in differing 
terms) that a high standard of care was a defence to that half-way house 
offence. 
1
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In an Austra ian case, Proudman v Dayman, it was held that the 
defendant had a good defence if he could show an 'honest and reasonable 
belief in a state of facts which, if they existed, would make the 
defendant's act innocent'. It is noteworthy that this judgment was cited 
. h 1 b h f d ' · 1 102 wit approva y t e House o Lor sin Sweet v Pais ey. 
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Another House of Lords decision, Alphacell Ltd v Woodward, showed 
that certain of the learned Judges foresaw the possibility of certain 
defences to strict liability offences. That case involved an overflow of 
pollution into a river. Although most of the discussion centred around 
the issue of whether the appellant company caused the prohibited pollution, 
Viscount Dilhorne thought that an inadvertant and unintentional act without 
104 
negligence might be a defence to the strict liability offence. Lord Cross 
of Chelsea thought that the appellants could have had a defence if the 
overflow had been 'brought about by some other event which could fairly be 
105 regarded as beyond their ability to foresee or control'. 
Although the bounds of these defences are narrow, they show a 
willingness on behalf of some of the learned Judges in the House of Lords 
32. 
to accept the possibility of defences to strict liability statutes. 
. f l . 106 . . . . . B v City o Sau t Ste Marie is a leading Canadian decision in 
this area. That case involved the offence of causing or permitting pollution 
of a creek. As well as unequivocably stating the Canadian Supreme Court's 
dislike of statutes not requiring mens rea, the Court also held that it was 
a valid defence to a strict liability offence for the accused to show that 
s/he took all reasonable care. 
The above cases are illustrations of how the Courts have gradually 
established and formulated valid defences to strict liability and half-
way house offences. This can be seen as part of the trend against strict 
liability; the more and wider the acceptable defences to strict liability, 
the less wide becomes the operation of such liability. 
5.3: A GENERAL DEFENCE? 
The cases illustrated could be interpreted as a movement towards a 
general defence to strict liability offences, which I shall label 'absence 
of fault'. The essence of the above cases seems to be that a good defence 
will lie where the defendant can show that s/he has exercised the standard 
of care that the situation demanded. Of course, this standard of care will 
vary from very high to less demanding, depending on the type of offence, 
surrounding circumstances, intention of the legislature etc. Nevertheless, 
each of the above Courts, in its own particular language, could be 
interpreted as saying that if the defendant exercises that standard of care 
required by the particular situation, then an 'absence of fault' defence 
will lie. 
5.4: THE TIFAGA POSITION: 
How do Kilbride and Tifaga fit in with this trend against strict 
liability and towards a general defence of 'absence of fault'? 
Firstly, Tifaga definitely establishes impossibility as a good defence 
to strict liability, the subject of impossibility/total absence of fault was 
dealt with in Creedon and in Ministry of Transport v Burnetts Motors Ltd
107 
but neither Court of Appeal decision went as far as Tifaga in unequivocably 
establishing impossibility as a general defence to all offences, subject to 
contrary wording of a statute. Thus Tifaga is an important step in clearly 
establishing impossibility as an acceptable defence and thereby limiting the 
scope of strict liability. 
33. 
It is also significant that Richmond P described impossibility 
as 'total absence of fault'. How does this concept of 'total absence of 
fault' compare with the idea of 'absence of fault' seemingly appare?t in 
the judgments of other New Zealand and overseas Courts? 
The judgments of Richmond P and Richardson Jin Tifaga must be seen 
as part of the judicial trend against strict liability. A general defence 
of 'total absence of fault' is clearly established, but the scope of this 
defence does not extend as far as the 'absence of fault' defence described 
above. In particular, the Tifaga defence (as I shall term the defence 
formulated by Richmond P and Richardson J) does not extend as far as the 
defence formulated in Proudman v Dayman or Sault Ste Marie. 
It is clear that the Tifaga de£ence requires a very high standard of 
care to be £ulfilled. The defendant must be free from all possible fault; 
s/he roust do all that is practically possible to avoid committing the 
offence. 
Therefore, Tifaga does not go as far as some other cases in moving 
towards a general defence to offences of a strict nature. It is, however, 
part of a general trend against strict liability upon which future decisions 
may be built. The breach is now opened and future Courts in New Zealand 
may widen the grounds on which a valid defence to a strict offence may 
stand. This is for future New Zealand Courts to decide. In the meantime 
Ti£aga will stand as authority £or total absence of fault being a defence 
to strict liability statute. 
The Woodhouse analysis in Tifaga and Kilbride is a new avenue of defence 
to offences that are strict in nature. As such, it also is part of a trend 
against strict liability. How use£ul or popular the Woodhouse defence turns 
out to be is also in the hands of New Zealand Courts but it is the op~nion 
of the writer that this form of analysis is conc eptually too novel and too 
difficult to achieve any wide importance o r utilisation. 
34. 
6. SUMMARY 
I have looked in detail at the Tifaga case and its importance in 
New Zealand criminal law. It will become an important case because: 
1. It provided Woodhouse J with an opportunity to explain his difficult 
and controversial decision in Kilbride. This he did, explaining 
that 'conscious volition or opportunity of choice' were means of 
testing causation of omissions. As such his reasoning is novel, 
and for this reason (along with its difficulty) unlikely to be 
utilised very often. However, it still remains as a possible 
weapon in the armoury of a defence counsel. 
2. It clearly establishes impossibility as a defence of general 
application, even to strict liability offences, provided that it 
is not excluded by the wording of the statute. Tifaga clears up 
any existing confusion existing between impossibility and 
inevitably, declaring them to be different names for the same 
offence. It also emphasises that impossibility will not be a 
defence where the impossible situation has been caused or 
contributed to by the defendant him/herself. This therefore 
entails a two stage test for the defence. 
3. 
What Tifaga does leave open is what standard of behaviour is 
needed to ful£ill the stages 0£ the test and therefore satisfy the 
requirements of the impossibility defence. 
Tifaga can be seen as part of a trend against strict liability as 
it firmly establishes a good defence to such offences. Although the 
judgments do not necessarily show a readiness to follow other Courts 
in their search for a general 'absence of fault' defence to strict 
liability, Tifaga may become a foundation upon which future 
breakdown of the ambit 0£ strict liability can be achieved. 
35. 
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